Obtaining digital evidence in the global world by Verdelho, Pedro
UNIO - EU Law Journal. Vol. 5, No. 2, July 2019, pp 136-145.
®2019 Centre of  Studies in European Union Law
School of  Law – University of  Minho
Obtaining digital evidence in the global world
Pedro Verdelho*
ABSTRACT: Gathering evidence in criminal proceedings is becoming more complicated each day. 
Cases are no longer merely national in nature. Nowadays most of  the cases require obtaining 
evidence from global Internet service providers. This means that evidence from a crime may be found 
anywhere. The Budapest Convention addresses this issue, in Article 32, allowing the competent 
authorities of  a State Party to seek data in another’s Party territory, in limited circumstances. The 
Portuguese law goes beyond those limited cases, allowing Portuguese authorities to extend searches 
beyond the physical and political borders of  Portugal, no matter where the data may physically be 
stored. The drafting process of  a Second Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention is currently 
ongoing.  It is expected that this exercise will allow State Parties to the Budapest Convention to seek 
an agreement on a number of  issues regarding obtaining evidence from the cloud, such as loss of  
location, or transborder searches, or direct cooperation with providers in other jurisdictions, amongst 
others.  
KEYWORDS: Digital evidence – loss of  location – transborder access to data – informal 
cooperation with providers.
* Public Prosecutor at the Prosecutor General’s Office - Cybercrime Office 
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 5, No. 2, July 2019
137 Pedro Verdelho
A) “Here” is “nowhere”
1. The Internet has taken over our daily life and our routines: we work, live, 
consume, have fun on the Internet and with the help of  the Internet.
On the other side, the Internet is no longer a simple set of  computers and servers 
whose location is well-known and where our contents and information are stored. It is 
now a complex framework of  networks and services. In there, we store our data and 
we look for other data or information we may need, or we may want to obtain.
These days, without the need for computer technical knowledge and sophisticated 
resources, merely using common equipment, we can store or obtain server-supported 
information hosted anywhere in the globe. This banal statement is simply a consequence 
of  the expansion of  the famous cloud, the ethereal and mysterious entity to whom we 
all entrust our informational lives. This famous cloud is accessible from anywhere, at any 
time, from any device and by anyone, provided the person owns the proper credentials. 
It can, therefore, be said that it is everywhere. That is, the information we make available 
and seek is globally disseminated and globally available.
2. Nevertheless, this informational globalization was not followed by a 
globalization in the criminal justice action. Indeed, citizens manage their information 
globally, using as daily routine online services (email, social networks, hotel or airplane 
booking services or payment services) from distant countries. Similarly, criminals enjoy 
the advantages of  globalization.
On the contrary, the action of  the law enforcement entities is, as it was a century 
ago, limited to the political and geographical boundaries of  their own State. That is, 
if  they find in their investigations facts that have occurred in other countries or if  
they need to obtain evidence in other countries, as a rule, in order to pursue their 
investigation, they must respect the sovereignty of  those other countries and therefore 
have to submit a request for international assistance.
With exceptions, namely at the European Union level, the rule, remains that 
international cooperation in criminal investigations related to more than one country 
should be requested.
3. This new globalised reality poses serious difficulties for criminal investigations, 
whether substantive or procedural.
By hosting content in the cloud, if  that content may itself  qualify as a criminal 
offense, it raises the prior question of  determining where the crime is committed. 
Content or facts that may qualify as criminal offenses in a jurisdiction may not have such 
a qualification in another jurisdiction. The most recurring example in the European 
judicial practice in this respect is that of  the crimes of  defamation and others regarding 
harm to honour and consideration: being qualified as crimes in some countries, while 
not being illegal acts in others (where they may fall under the right to freedom of  
expression).
Thus, without determining the place where the crime occurred, it is not possible 
to determine which criminal law is applicable and, therefore, to whom the jurisdiction 
belongs. In a cloud-hosting environment where data and information are an unknown, 
sometimes even undetermined or undeterminable location, this problem is difficult to 
solve in the absence of  legislative initiative.
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B) The Budapest Convention
4. In fact, international law is still quite unprepared for this globalized crime. 
From the perspective of  most international treaties and conventions, the dominant 
view is still the prevalence of  sovereignty of  each State over the facts that occur in its 
territory, excluding the possibility of  any action within their borders by authorities of  
other States. This perspective clashes head-on with the enormous demands that digital 
evidence imposes on criminal investigation authorities.
5. However, it is important to mention an exception to this general rule, which 
is enshrined in Article 32 of  the Budapest Convention1 (the Council of  Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime).
In fact, according to this provision, the competent authorities of  a State, Party 
to the Budapest Convention, may obtain evidence digitally stored in the territory of  
another State Party, in two different situations: i) when that digital evidence is open to 
public access (open source); ii) when that digital evidence is not open to free access but 
the lawful and voluntary consent of  the person who has the lawful authority to disclose 
the data was obtained. In both cases, the competent authorities of  the first State may 
access or receive, through a computer system in its territory, stored computer data 
located in the other Party.
6. This legal approach, binding several States,2 is an important move forward, since 
it allows, even if  in limited circumstances, access to evidence stored abroad, namely in 
the cloud. Nevertheless, as stated, this provision is limited. Furthermore, some legal 
issues regarding its interpretation have been raised. 
In this juncture, it is important to consider the opinion of  the Cybercrime 
Convention Committee (hereinafter “T-CY”), who issued a Guidance Note referring 
to it.3 According to this Guidance Note, it is recognised that the provisions of  Article 
32 are exceptions to the principle of  territoriality, because it permits, without the need 
for mutual assistance, access data stored abroad.   
The provision of  Article 32(a) did not raise any specific issue: it is commonly 
understood and accepted that the competent authorities from one State may access 
data that the public free and openly may access.
But with Article 32(b) the issue is not as clear. Parties to the Budapest Convention 
support the implementation of  the provision, while some countries oppose it. One 
country4 refused to join the Convention because of  this Article.
1 Article 32. Trans -border access to stored computer data with consent or where publicly available. A 
Party may, without the authorisation of  another Party: Access publicly available (open source) stored 
computer data, regardless of  where the data is located geographically; or b) Access or receive, through 
a computer system in its territory, stored computer data located in another Party, if  the Party obtains 
the lawful and voluntary consent of  the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the data to 
the Party through that computer system.
2 In fact, it is supposed that all the Parties to the Budapest Convention have implemented domestically 
this provision. The Budapest Convention has currently (September 2019), 64 Parties, while another 
3 signed but did not ratify it yet and 5 others were invited to access (https://www.coe.int/en/web/
conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185).
3 Guidance Notes of  the (T-CY) are informal opinions that, nevertheless, represent the common 
understanding of  the Parties to the Convention, regarding the use of  the treaty, aiming  at 
facilitating the effective use and implementation of  the Budapest Convention, also in the light of  
legal, policy and technological developments. A Guidance Note on the question of  transborder 
access to data under Article 32 Budapest Convention is publicly available here: https://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016802e726a.
4 Russia. 
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7. As said, in short, according to Article 32(b), the competent authorities from 
one Party are authorised to access data stored in the territory of  another Party with 
consent of  the person legally authorised to consent. As the Guidance Note underlines, 
it is clear that the consent needs to be lawful (thus not illegal) and voluntary (thus, free 
– not forced).
From this approach, one must also conclude that this consent cannot be provided 
by a national authority (for example a judge), even if  in case that authority has the legal 
power to override the lack of  authorisation.
Examples of  this situation may occur, for instance, where the owner of  an email 
account stored abroad allows authorities of  his own country, where he is present, to 
remotely access that email account. Or the situation where the holder of  a Facebook 
profile provides authorization to the authorities of  his own country to access his profile.
8. Article 32(b) is not a mutual legal assistance toll. In fact, it seems more a 
unilateral action, from a State, not requiring the intervention of  the other State. Thus, 
for example, a notification to that State is not foreseen in Article 32 – albeit it is true 
that it is also not precluded.
9. Another perspective, it is also clear that Article 32 of  the Budapest Convention 
only applies within the territory of  the contracting Parties to the Convention: since it is 
a treaty, the Budapest Convention only binds those countries that ratified it or acceded 
to it. 
This obvious conclusion constitutes a strong limit to its scope. In fact, on the one 
hand, the number of  Parties to the Budapest Convention, even if  constantly growing, 
is still limited, and does not include yet a number of  relevant States regarding the real 
cybercrime world. On the other hand, due to the limits of  applicability of  the physical 
borders of  the Parties, this excludes the possibility to apply Article 32 when the location 
of  data is unknown – since in that case, it is not possible to determine if  the data are, or 
not, within the territory of  a State Party. It will be, for instances, the case of  data stored 
in different pieces (packets), in multiple locations, or data in undetermined location or, 
generically, data on the darkweb.
10. Thus, even if  this is an interesting approach, it is clear that Article 32 of  the 
Budapest Convention is not useful in most of  the investigations regarding obtaining 
evidence in the cloud, or on the darkweb. 
That notwithstanding the text of  the Budapest Convention does not preclude 
or limit the adoption of  other solutions at national level. However, such unilateral 
domestic measures have neither the recognition nor the legitimacy of  international law. 
This factor has crucial importance: in many jurisdictions, the conducting of  criminal 
investigations by foreign entities is not only prohibited but even criminally relevant.
C) Investigation in the cloud and the Portuguese law
11. As already emphasised, the methods used by criminals have modernized 
while legal procedural tools remain tied to the geographical and political boundaries of  
States. Similarly, substantive criminal law rules confer jurisdiction on States on the same 
basis as they did in the pre-Internet world. It may occur that a criminal makes available 
in the cloud, digital materials with criminal content (for example child pornography) 
and, nevertheless, the State where he lives does not have jurisdiction regarding the case, 
because the location of  the data is unknown and might be outside of  the frontiers of  
the State.
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In this scenario, fighting cybercrime remains really difficult, since criminals live 
and act globally, while criminal justice authorities are limited to their national borders. 
12. In this regard, Portuguese national law moved somewhat forward: the 
Cybercrime Law (Law No. 109/2009 of  15 September) introduced an extension to the 
general rules for the application of  Portuguese criminal law. In general, the Portuguese 
criminal law applies, as occurs in many other States, to national citizens and to facts 
occurring on the national territory. In addition, it also applies to facts occurring abroad, 
when practiced by Portuguese or against Portuguese citizens.
Moreover, the Cybercrime Law, in its Article 27, states that, besides the general 
cases, the Portuguese criminal law is still applicable to facts; (a) practised by Portuguese 
citizens, if  no other law is applicable; (b) committed for the benefit of  legal entities 
established in the Portuguese territory; (c) acts physically committed in Portuguese 
territory, even if  they relate to computer systems located outside that territory; and 
(d) facts related to computer systems located in the Portuguese territory, regardless of  
where these facts are physically practised.
This extension of  jurisdiction is intended to allow courts to apply Portuguese 
criminal law to acts which in some way relate to the country and, in particular, if  no 
other national law applies to them.
13. It is also important to mention the mechanism and criteria provided for in 
number 2 and number 3 of  the same Article 27, which apply to situations in which it 
is found that both Portuguese law and that of  another State are applicable. This legal 
provision provides rules in view of  deciding which one of  the States should centralize 
the procedure.
14. However, substantive criminal law issues do not exhaust the difficulties 
caused by informational globalization. As mentioned before, another one of  the 
serious difficulties with criminal investigations is the procedural limitation imposed on 
investigators from acting outside their national borders.
It has been said that the famous cloud is everywhere, spread globally. That is, to 
put it another way when there is evidence of  crimes in the cloud, that evidence can 
be physically stored anywhere. It can even be said that, in most cases, these days, any 
investigation may need evidence stored in the cloud, i.e. it may be anywhere. In fact, for 
this purpose, purely national investigations no longer exist, since any investigation may 
need evidence stored elsewhere, in any place on the other side of  the planet (potentially).
Nevertheless, the truth is that for the purposes of  criminal investigation, the cloud, 
which is everywhere, is also nowhere: it has no seat or headquarters, no postal address, or 
any physical premises or offices. This diffusion poses a serious difficulty to criminal 
investigations because it makes it difficult to clarify which criminal law and criminal 
procedure law should apply in the activity of  obtaining information in the cloud.
This difficulty is compounded, as said when the data is stored on multiple servers, 
or on servers whose physical location is unknown or undetermined, or on darkweb 
servers, whose physical location is usually impossible to determine.
15. Also in this regard, the Portuguese Cybercrime Law introduced and interesting 
approach: Portugal authorizes its criminal justice authorities to act virtually outside the 
borders of  the country, while allowing the authorities of  other States (third countries) 
to act virtually on servers physically located in Portugal, in view of  obtaining evidence.
After the ratification of  the Budapest Convention by Portugal (again, the reference 
is Article 32(b) of  the Convention), the Portuguese criminal justice authorities are 
allowed to access data stored on a computer physically present in another State (Party 
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of  the Convention), remotely, without the permission or any intervention of  the other 
State, as already explained above.
Correspondingly, according to Article 25 of  the Cybercrime Law, it is allowed to 
the competent foreign authorities, without prior request to the Portuguese authorities 
or any other kind of  authorization, in accordance with the rules on data protection, to 
“access, through a computer system located in its territory, to computer data stored in Portugal, with the 
legal and voluntary consent of  a person legally authorized to disclose it”.
16. But probably, the most interesting and innovative procedural approach of  the 
Cybercrime Law regards the extension of  computer searches. 
Article 15 of  the Cybercrime Law provides for the search for computer data, 
an expression that the law adopted for what could also be referred to as computer 
search. Basically, the provisions of  the article have the common aim of  adapting to the 
digital environment and to computer systems’ classic procedural measure of  search. 
Thus, this procedural tool, described in Article 15 of  the Cybercrime Law, is a form 
of  coercive access to a computer system. To this end, the rules for the execution of  
the searches, provided for in the Code of  Criminal Procedure also apply to computer 
searches, unless expressly provided for and mutatis mutandis, according to Article 15, 
paragraph 6 of  the Cybercrime Law. The same would already be inferred from the 
rules on paragraphs 2 to 4, which contain substantive provisions of  the same nature as 
the correspondent rules on searches, within the Code of  Criminal Procedure.
17. Those are general and common rules. But the same is not true for the particular 
rule introduced by Article 15, paragraph 5, which allows the extension of  the search to 
other computer systems.
Paragraph 5 states that when “in the course of  a computer search, reasons arise to believe 
that the data sought is in another computer system, but that such data is legitimately accessible from the 
initial system, the search can be extended.” That is, criminal justice authorities are allowed to 
access a remote computer system, departing from a local computer system, if  during 
a lawful search to this last, they find out that from this particular computer system it 
is legitimately permitted to access the remote system. This legal possibility includes, 
for example, where the search subject uses an Internet-based e-mail (a webmail), the 
possibility to access that account if  it is lawfully requested, is usually accessed from the 
computer under search. 
This is a quite powerful tool, allowing authorities to access data in the cloud, by the 
means of  computer systems belonging, for example, to suspects. In fact, in a number 
of  cases, no one other than the intended person can access a certain remote system, 
as he is the only holder of  the access credentials. Eventually, there is no other way to 
access it, except by intervening directly with the server/host of  that system, which is 
not always possible.
18. The provision of  Article 15, paragraph 5, is clearly inspired by Article 19, 
paragraph 2 of  the Budapest Convention, which already provides for extension of  
searches when, during a search, there are grounds to believe that the data sought is 
stored in another computer system. However, according to the Budapest Convention, 
this provision only allows the extension of  the search to remote systems physically 
located within the territory of  the State that carries out the investigation.
On the contrary, Article 15, paragraph 5 of  the Cybercrime Law allows the 
extension regardless the location of  the remote system. In fact, this extension of  
computer searches is indifferent to the physical location of  the remote system. That is, 
the search can be extended to either systems located within the Portuguese territory or 
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to systems located elsewhere, abroad or even in an unknown location. The criterion for 
the extension is solely the legitimacy of  the access, departing from the system under 
investigation (under search).
19. Another interesting procedural tool of  the Portuguese legal system is enshrined 
in Article 14 of  the Cybercrime Law, which provides for the so-called injunction to 
present or grant access to data.
It is an innovative provision in the context of  the Portuguese law, inspired 
directly by Article 18 of  the Cybercrime Convention. The underlying reasons are the 
fact that, sometimes, the criminal investigation process requires obtaining information 
stored in computer systems with a large storage capacity, where access to which might 
be enormously complex. In such types of  situations, difficulties arise in coercively 
accessing information: in the immense storage space of  modern digital media, it can 
be very difficult and time consuming to find the sought information without the 
collaboration of  those to whom data is available on the system. On the other hand, 
the various possibilities of  hiding information or blocking access to it (e.g. by the use 
of  encryption techniques or entering passwords for access to folders or documents) 
can make the search for information an unsuccessful activity, if  carried out without the 
collaboration of  the controller of  it.
20. Thus, an injunction is an order, served by a judicial authority to anyone to whom 
data is available or has control over certain computer data, in view to communicate or 
give access to the data in question. Such an order must be complied with and cannot 
be refused. Because of  that, it is, therefore, clear from the text of  the law that the 
injunction cannot be addressed to suspects or defendants. Otherwise, the provision 
would clash with the right to non-self-incrimination.
In fact, this procedure is specifically intended to enable information to be 
obtained from computer systems belonging to other than suspects or defendants. This 
will be the paradigmatic case of  service providers. But this will not be the only case. 
This provision also makes it easier, for example, to gain access to computers within 
corporate structures where suspects are employees and whose systems kept evidence 
of  their unlawful activities.
21. Article 14 of  the Cybercrime Law is clearly inspired by Article 18 of  the 
Budapest Convention. This is quite relevant since according to the Convention, Article 
18 applies both to domestic providers and providers based (with its seat or headquarters) 
in other States if  they provide services in the territory of  the investigative State. That 
is, according to Article 18, one State may address directly a provider in other State, 
seeking data.
In this matter, it is also relevant to consider a Guidance Note issued by the T-CY, 
the Cybercrime Convention Committee.5 According to it, “Article 18.1.b, may include a 
service provider that has its headquarters in one jurisdiction, but stores the data in another jurisdiction”. 
The key point at this respect is that the provider “offers its services in the territory of  the 
investigating State. The storage of  subscriber information in another jurisdiction does not prevent the 
application of  Article 18 Budapest Convention as long as such data is in the possession or control 
of  the requested service provider”. On the other side, the Guidance Note also states that 
‘possession or control’ refers to data “in the service provider’s physical possession and to remotely 
stored subscriber information under the service provider’s control”.
22. Thus, according to the Portuguese legal framework (including both the 
Budapest Convention and the Cybercrime Law), criminal investigation authorities are 
5 This Guidance Note is available here: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/guidance-notes. 
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entitled to issue injunctions directed to foreign service providers if  they provide services 
to customers or subscribes in Portugal. And this is still valid, even if  the provider does 
not have an office, or an establishment, or a legal representative in the country. 
23. As abovementioned, Article 14 is applicable to obtaining information in 
possession of  service providers, namely costumer or subscriber information.6 In 
fact, this legal provision is the regular and most common legal basis used to request 
information from service providers. 
In this respect, it is an obvious conclusion that in modern criminal investigations, 
the importance of  evidence in possession of  Internet service providers has grown 
substantially. Increasingly, these private entities store personal data, communications 
records, and content data that may be of  great importance and, often, most precious 
in identifying suspects and demonstrating the perpetration of  crime. This is valid 
regarding providers based in the investigative State, but also regarding providers based 
in other jurisdictions, with costumers or subscribers spread all over the world.
24. Those were the legal grounds that motivated the Portuguese Prosecution 
Service to approach a number of  foreign service providers, in view of  facilitating the 
communication, with the purpose that Portuguese prosecutors could issue injunctions 
directed to those providers and that they reply to them in an efficient manner. 
As a result of  this approach, it became quite frequent to Portuguese Prosecutors to 
serve injunctions to entities like Facebook, or Google, or Microsoft and be responded 
to directly by them, without the need to use the regular mutual legal assistance channels.
According to a publicly available report7, this mechanism has proved to be of  
great practical effectiveness because it facilitates the timely obtaining of  essential 
information for criminal investigations without the bureaucratic complexities of  the 
mutual legal assistance mechanisms. On the other hand, the possibility of  directly 
obtaining subscriber information allowed them to obtain certain types of  information 
easier because, before, in practice, it was not possible, at all, to obtain information in 
this manner. 
D) Remaining challenges
25. Despite the national and international mechanisms, the truth is that cybercrime 
keeps growing.  Everyday, more crimes occur online, by the means, or with the help 
of  the communications networks. Those crimes produce digital evidence that remains 
stored in a number of  countries – sometimes, maybe unknown or unidentified countries.
The development of  the technologies, the constant growth of  the possibilities 
to remain anonymous online, cloud computing, the simultaneous use of  multiple 
devices and platforms, or encryption, render the gathering of  electronic evidence for 
6  Subscriber information is defined, at this respect, in Article 14, paragraph 4 of  the Cybercrime Law:
4 - The provisions of  this Article will apply to service providers, who may be ordered to report data 
on their customers or subscribers, which would include any information other than the traffic data or 
the content data, held by the service provider, in order to determine: a) the type of  communication 
service used, the technical measures taken in this regard and the period of  service; b) the identity, 
postal or geographic address and telephone number of  the subscriber, and any other access number, 
the data for billing and payment available under a contract or service agreement, or c) any other 
information about the location of  communication equipment, available under a contract or service 
agreement.
7 Such as this annual report of  the Cybercrime Office of  the Prosecutor General’s Office: http://
cibercrime.ministeriopublico.pt/sites/default/files/documentos/pdf/relatorio_anual_gabinete_
cibercrime2015_02-03-2017.pdf. 
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criminal justice purposes highly complex. Besides, mutual legal assistance procedures 
are inefficient, in the face of  the natural volatility of  digital evidence. Thus, criminal 
investigations related to online, or digital cases is becoming less efficient each day. 
These conclusions, among others, can be further explored in two important 
reports, from two working parties of  the Council of  Europe, the Ad-hoc Subgroup on 
Transborder Access and Jurisdiction and the Cloud Evidence Group,8 both of  them developing 
their work in the context of  the Committee of  the Cybercrime Convention (T-CY). 
Both reports raised difficult questions and challenges to criminal justice regarding 
the location of  a crime (thus, which is the applicable substantive law, and which is the 
competent jurisdiction, for prosecutorial purposes). On the other side, these reports 
express concerns in view of  the limits to criminal investigation, posed by the jurisdictional 
issues, regarding, for example, cross border investigations, or investigations in the cloud.
26. Certainly, the solution to these difficult problems is neither easy nor obvious. 
It requires international dialogue, understanding, and concertation. In the search for 
solutions to ensure rule of  law and justice, respect for human rights and the interests 
of  victims, it clashes with other superior interests, sometimes conflicting with the 
previous, such as respect for the legality or sovereignty and independence of  States.
This general concern drove the Cloud Evidence Group to propose the drafting of  
a new international treaty: an Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention. This 
proposal was addressed to the T-CY Committee of  the Council of  Europe, which, on 
its 17th Plenary Meeting, on 8 June 2017, approved it.9 Moreover, the T-CY Committee 
also issued the Terms of  Reference10 for the Preparation of  a Draft 2nd Additional Protocol 
to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.
According to the Terms of  Reference, a special working group was committed 
to discuss and draft the terms of  the Second Additional Protocol to the Budapest 
Convention. This drafting process should have been finished by December 2019 but, 
due to the complexity of  the ongoing work, the term was extended until December 
2020. 
27. The general purpose of  this future Second Additional Protocol to the 
Budapest Convention is to fulfil the gaps on international law posed by the new 
challenges of  obtaining digital evidence from the cloud. In substantive terms, one 
of  the first options of  the protocol is to include provisions to make more efficient 
international cooperation. It is clearly assumed that, regarding digital evidence, the 
current international cooperation model is not being efficient enough and needs less 
formality and some flexibility. For example, one of  the points to explore regards the 
language of  the requests. 
On the other side, the future Protocol should address informal cooperation 
between States and Internet service providers. Currently, a number of  States have in 
place informal mechanisms of  obtaining information from their side. However, only a 
few of  them have proper regulation in place at this respect. Moreover, at the international 
level, in general, there is no coercive mechanism to make these requests compulsory 
– thus, all the process depends on is the good will of  the providers. Moreover, it 
8 The final report of  the Ad-hoc Subgroup on Transborder Access and Jurisdiction is available here https://
rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016
802e726e, and the final report of  the Cloud Evidence Group is available here https://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806a495e.
9 The report of  this meeting is available here https://rm.coe.int/t-cy-17-meeting-report-/168072366d.
10 The Terms of  Reference are available here https://rm.coe.int/terms-of-reference-for-the-prepara-
tion-of-a-draft-2nd-additional-proto/168072362b.
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is expected the future protocol to provide a legal framework to this existing current 
practice will make the request a prerequisite.
The same can be said regarding the current practices, developed by some States, 
to access and obtain digital evidence across the borders. Some States already introduced 
into domestic frameworks provisions allowing the national competent authorities 
to access data physically stored outside the borders of  the State. However, at the 
international level, this practise has no recognition yet. 
As said, this is the case of  Portugal, as described above these lines.
Another important component expected from the Protocol is a set of  provisions 
on procedural guarantees and safeguards, including referring to data protection.
28. In practice, it is expected that this future additional protocol to the Budapest 
Convention considers issues such as a simplified regime for mutual legal assistance, 
requests for subscriber information, or international production orders, or direct 
cooperation between judicial authorities in mutual legal assistance requests, or joint 
investigations and joint investigation teams. Loss of  location and existing transborder 
accesses should also be discussion, during the drafting process.
The ongoing process and the provisions under negotiation by the State Parties to 
the Budapest Convention can be followed on the web page of  the T-CY Committee,11 
where all the published reports of  the drafting groups are also available.
11 https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/t-cy-drafting-group. 
